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Abstract 
 
Due to the increasingly integration and thus inter-dependency between the global economy, a 
given national economy and their societal embedment a triangulation between the three 
elements is a must if one is to understand the dynamic processes between them. This article 
focuses especially on the national economic and societal aspects of such a triangulation thus 
positioning the national dependencies of the global economy in the background. The notion of 
triangulation is perceived by the author to be more holistic and relational oriented compared 
to an approach based on decoupling. The latter aims through sector defined studies to assess 
the level of connectivity between global and national economics as well as between them and 
their societal embedment in order to detect whether there are potential fault-lines between the 
three thus mitigating the notion of decoupling. This article applies a triangular approach on the 
                                                 
1 Paper for the 4th East Asian Net Research Workshop at Charles University, Prague. 6-7 October, 2010. Please do not quote 
or cite without the permission from the author. 
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electronic and electrical manufacturing sector in Penang. It concentrates in particular on how 
companies within this sector relate to pertinent governmental initiated industry policies and 
the impact of the inter-ethnic related affirmative action policy in this connection. The global 
aspect of the triangulation has thus been put on a back burner in this study, as the article 
emphasises the importance of pointing towards the inter-dependency between the political, 
the inter-ethnic and the economic sectors in Penang, as they are perceived to condition each 
other.  
 
Keywords: Decoupling, triangulation, economic development, inter-ethnic relations, 
industrialisation, nation building, Penang, Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this age of globalisation it seems a bit odd talking about decoupling from the global 
community. How is it possible to decouple from a world where increasing interdependency 
and harmonisation are keywords? In the political realm it seems almost meaningless to 
suggest that a nation state could withdraw from the global community thus concentrating and 
nurturing its domestic potentials. Looking towards the economic realm it seem even more 
unreasonable talking about a national economy withdrawing from the global economy taking 
the increasing internationalisation of local markets into account. Nonetheless, there is a 
discourse that discusses just that, namely whether or not to decouple economically and 
politically from the global community. And it is not only representatives from academia that 
discuss this for the sake of either verifying or falsifying the notion of decoupling. Many 
politicians and economist seem to view decoupling as a viable possibility or solution, when 
the domestic political and economic situation clashes with an ever entrenching globalisation 
jeopardising local interest in the process. The present article explores this discourse by first 
taking a critically look at the concept of decoupling. It then proceeds by presenting an 
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alternative approach to studying the relationship between the global and national by 
introducing the concept of triangulation. The basic idea behind this is that the relationship 
between economic globalisation, national economics and a given societal context in which the 
two former is embedded is governed by various layers of interdependency. This means that 
one cannot focus solely on one corner of the triangle thus decouple, so to speak, the other 
two corners in the triangle in order to understand, for example, the political forces at play 
there. One has to take all three points in the triangle into account in order to disentangle the 
complex web of interdependency between them. To illustrate the importance of this approach 
a case study based on the electronic and electrical manufacturing sector industry in Penang, 
Malaysia, is introduced. The paper ends up by returning to the decoupling discourse in order 
to discuss it in the light of the findings from the case study. 
 
 
On the notion of decoupling: real possibility or an intellectual exercise? 
A relevant point of departure for beginning debunking the notion of decoupling is to search for 
its roots. Here the Dependency School that dominated the academic discourse during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s immediately springs into mind with its focus on an almost 
deadlocked political and economic dual power structure consisting of a Third World 
development relative to developments in a First World. The theoretical foundation behind this 
duality was mainly based on neo-Marxist approaches formulated by scholars such as Gunder 
Frank, Dos Santos, Amin, Cardoso and Wallerstein. The point of departure of this school of 
thought was historical and structural determined processes that sprang from a colonialist and 
imperialist perspective, and centred on either a center-periphery relationship in which capital 
accumulation and export orientation was the main point of departure. A related notion of a 
dual world structure was the metropole-satellite relationship, which focused on how industrial 
and agricultural sectors related to each other. The main region where these approaches were 
applied was Latin America. The link to the current discourse on decoupling was provided by 
Gunder Frank, who maintained that Third World countries should de-link from the First World 
in order to develop as such linkages were harmful for the periphery. The way in which this de-
linking was to take place were by having fewer linkages to the center and thus concentrate on 
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domestic development and import substitution, all guided by a developmental state based on 
a revolutionary socialist ideology. 
 
As is well-known these theoretical macro perspective were later replaced by multi-polar 
theories of globalisation in which multinational companies were the main players and nation 
states economic facilitators for industrial internationalisation processes, - events that in 
particular has resulted in theories of international business practices. Up until 2008 observers 
found supportive evidence for notions of decoupling in especially emerging markets in Asia, 
as some of these economies from the 1970s and onwards seem to be relatively unscathed 
from the troubled Western economies. A good case in point is the discourse on Asian Values 
during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, and again after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 in 
the tremendous economic growth of especially China and India as well as much higher 
growth rates in the rest of East and Southeast Asia compared to those in the Western 
economies. As such emerging economies were perceived to be resistant towards the 
contractions in the American and European economies due to their strong and constantly 
growing domestic markets, high currency reserves and prudent macro-economic policies, 
partly based on experiences learnt during the 1997 financial crisis and partly based on 
perceived specific modes on doing business compared to their Western counterparts. 
 
During 2008 and 2009, however, cracks in the notion of decoupling began to emerge again. 
The meltdown on Wall Street in the fall of 2008 sent shockwaves through the entire global 
financial system, not least in the emerging Asian markets. Contrary to what the decouplers 
expected, the losses were even greater outside the US with the worst experienced in 
emerging markets and developed economies like Germany and Japan. Even though China 
was relatively hard hit by the global economic contraction that followed the financial 
meltdown, it experienced together with India and a group of larger emerging markets in Asia a 
decent rebound, whereas the US, Europe and Japan still to this day remain more or less 
troubled by the ongoing financial turmoil. 
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Here in the first half of 2010 it seems as if we are approaching the bottom of the seemingly ‘U’ 
shaped economic crisis. Taking the many state introduced fiscal-stimulus packages into 
account around the globe in order to stabilise the individual national economy it seems at 
least for the time being that the Asia packages have had the greatest impact on the individual 
economies thus rejuvenating in the process an otherwise rather battered notion of decoupling. 
Some have advocated for the emergence of a new generation of decoupling related theories. 
However, the main question is whether the current stabilising of the Asian economies is a 
sign of a budding decoupling from the global economy, in particular the Western economies! 
This is still too early to state as a fact, as we do not know whether the current recovery will be 
sustained once the effects of the massive stimulus packages begin the fade. 
 
Taking a critical approach towards analysing these developments from a decoupling 
perspective, China, like the other emerging East and Southeast Asian economies still remain 
tied to the US economy through the dollar. Without a delinking from the dollar, a decoupling of 
the East and Southeast Asian economies from the US economy remains unlikely. Another 
aspect that goes against an acceptance of a decoupling perspective based on a differentiated 
level of economic recovering is the relationship between decoupling and economic 
contextualisation. Even though the individual economy has been stimulated by its respective 
state this is not to say that the economy is also becoming detached from the global economy. 
The linkages between a national economy and the global economy are still there, as can be 
seen when looking at the national economy’s dependency of foreign direct investments (FDI) 
for its continued existence and its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) thus 
aligning its economy with the global one. What about political decoupling then? This has been 
tried by ASEAN through its 1998 initiated developmental regionalism experiment in the Asian 
region. This was shot down 2001 by the major global economic players as being an attempt 
to introduce differentiated levels of competitiveness between the national, regional and global 
level thus damaging the free flow of capital (Nesadurai 2004). 
 
As can be seen it is problematic to employ the notion of decoupling, as the global – local 
nexus is rather strong and pervasive. It seems as if the notion of decoupling is to cover up for 
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a process that can be defined as a budding dismantling of a US and European global 
economic hegemony and a move towards a more fluid and contextualised conditioned shifting 
of centres of capital accumulation. Asia (and China and India in particular) is a very good 
case in point, taking the current developments in this region into consideration! De- or re-
coupling, if we are to use these terms at all, seems to this author to be not so much of an 
economic nature, but rather constitutes a part of a political inspired discourse in which the 
notion of de- or re-coupling constitutes a potent political signifier. Taking this stand on 
decoupling reduces it to a domestic policy manifestation that reflects a current position in an 
international landscape of multiple and shifting power centres, thereby unintentional accepting 
an increasing global interdependency between and harmonisation of the individual national 
economies. 
 
 
Introducing an alternative to notions of decoupling: a triangular analysis based on 
interdependency between the global economy, the national economy and the societal 
context in which both are embedded 
Due to the above discussion of an increasing interdependency between the global economy, 
a given national economy and societal factors in this context a triangulation between the three 
is a must if the processes and thus the inter-dependencies between the three players in the 
triangle are to be fleshed out. This article focuses in particularly on the national economic and 
societal aspects of this triangulation thus leaving the national dependencies of the global 
economy simmering in the background. One of the reasons for this priority is that the present 
article is mainly based on institutional theory when analysing the relationship between the 
national economy and the societal factors that colours the industrial setup. This means that it 
is not only the economic performance of Malaysia, the country chosen for this analysis, that is 
important when seen from a global investment perspective, but also the institutional setup and 
more general societal factors that constitute very important sources of information when 
deciding whether or not to invest in Malaysia. The main geographical area of interest in 
Malaysia is Penang, and the chosen industry sectors in Penang are in particular the Chinese 
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owned electronic and electrical manufacturing companies of which Penang is famous for 
accommodating so successfully. 
 
The article will not go into detail with the electronic and electrical manufacturing sector per se, 
but instead focus on how the companies within this sector relate to pertinent governmental 
initiated industrial policies as well as how they relate to the impact of the inter-ethnic related 
affirmative action policy, as defined in the ‘old’ New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1971 and 
onwards. 
In order to initiate this discussion it is imperative to take a point of departure in the 
composition of the population in Malaysia, as that is an all-important issue to take into 
account before discussing any economic and political developments in this country. The three 
dominant ethnic groups in Malaysia are the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, which in 
2006 were categorised as below2
 
: 
Malaysia Penang State 
Malays 56 % 40 % 
Chinese 31 % 43 % 
Indian 7 % 10 % 
Others (including Orang Asli) 6 % 7 % 
 
Since the introduction of the NEP in 1971 this inter-ethnic setup has more or less been locked 
in terms of inter-ethnic harmonisation. A driving force behind this is the above mentioned 
affirmative action policy that favours ethnic Malays on behalf of the other two ethnic groups, - 
a policy that was initiated after the Kuala Lumpur riots in 1969 and written into the NEP in 
1971. According to observers this has resulted in a hardening of ethnic borders thus making 
social and societal mobility across ethnic boundaries rather difficult. Processes of identity 
formation are therefore still closely following ethnic borders. 
                                                 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penang. It has so far not been possible to find more updated data in this connection. 
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The main consequences of this are that the most important jobs within the state bureaucracy 
are not necessarily manned by the best educated, and the students at the universities are not 
necessarily the best qualified due to the politically designed affirmative action policy with its 
emphasis on promoting the Malay. Perhaps the most serious consequence of this inter-ethnic 
deadlock is that it denies Malaysia its freedom of manoeuvre in a situation that demands 
action when confronted by serious domestic economic problems such as an erosion of its 
competitive base, a decrease in private investments, a decline in productivity and a serious 
‘brain-drain’ situation within both academia and industry.3
 
 These problems have to be seen in 
relation to the current global economy that is characterised by financial and economic 
contractions. For Penang in particular this has meant that the main economic players, the 
multinational companies (MNCs), in the electronic manufacturing sector are contemplating 
moving to other Asian economies such as, for example, Vietnam, Indonesia or India, which 
offer better factor conditions than Penang is currently capable of doing. This means that if 
Penang is to uphold its position as a regional high-tech hub then it has to move up the value 
chain by making the 250 plus MNCs in the high-tech business move their R&D departments 
to Penang. 
The possibility for doing so is there due to a highly developed industrial infrastructure and an 
investor friendly government. The problem is, however, that a complex state bureaucracy is 
taking a toll on an effective handling of business matters. The same goes for the production of 
university graduates for the R&D heavy industries. As mentioned above one of the main 
reasons behind these serious problems is the politically designed affirmative action policy that 
emphasises ethnic belonging over the best qualified individuals regardless of ethnic 
background. Even though the political establishment has maintained several times that the 
affirmative action policy is to be phased out and all citizens of Malaysia regardless of ethnic 
belonging is to be perceived as Malaysian per se it is still very much in place. The political 
cost of dismantle the policy seems to be too high for the Malays. Basically the reluctance of 
initiating such a change jeopardizes the overall strategy of moving Penang up the value 
chain. The frozen ethnic boundaries and thus locked mode of identity formation constitute a 
                                                 
3 Poh Heem Heem. Penang Economic Monthly. June 2010. 
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kind of lid on the economic development in this the fourth largest contributor to the Malaysian 
GDP. 
 
In the following the main focus will be on the ethnic Chinese owned SMEs within the 
electronic and electrical manufacturing sector. They are to constitute a counter study towards 
a stereotypical perception of the Chinese as an intra-ethnical oriented as well as more or less 
homogeneous group.4 The article takes a more critical perspective of the ethnic Chinese thus 
introducing a more complex view stressing that the Chinese entrepreneurs are more inter-
ethnic rather than intra-ethnic oriented economic players.5
 
 This way of perceiving the Chinese 
Malays demonstrates that stereotypically notions of Chinese-ness might be based on a 
politically motivated process of social engineering that is to legitimise a perpetuation of the 
current affirmative action policy towards the ethnic majority. In order to introduce a holistic 
analysis of these development the following sections focus on the economic setup in Penang, 
how the ethnic Chinese SME community relate to the economic policies of the Penang state 
and how the affirmative action policies impact on it in this connection. The article focuses in 
particular on the impact of the governmental initiated economic facilitators which are to 
stimulate the overall SME community in Penang. The article contextualises this discussion by 
introducing the national political ideology Vision 2020 together with the more concrete 
developmental schemes coined the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and the Northern 
Corridor Economic Region (NCER). The idea is to assess the impact these national initiatives 
have on the Penang industrial setup. As stated above, this article is determined to show the 
importance of institutional analyses on not only the economy in Penang, but also within 
Malaysia as a whole, as the affirmative action policy and its many ramifications hits 
nationwide thus providing a potential global investor with a solid set of data on which to 
decide whether to invest or not. 
 
On the Economic set-up in Penang 
                                                 
4 Gomez (2002), Gomez and Benton (2004), Boulton (2005), Yeung (1999). 
5 Jacobsen (2006), Yen Ching-Hwang (2002), Tan Chee-Beng (2004). 
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When discussing the economic development of Penang one has to distinguish between prior 
and post 1971. In pre-1971 Penang was mainly a plantation economy mixed up with 
government initiated import substitution initiatives. This was to ensure that the local economy 
could stay independent of foreign interests and produce enough for local consumption. As 
there were no manufacturing companies and as the British owned companies in mainly the 
trading and plantation sector did not restore their operations to the pre-war level after WWII, 
unemployment was rather high during that period. 
 
After 1971 things changed quite rapidly. Due to a progressive Penang State government 
under Tun Lim Chong Eu the government identified the electronic industry as having the best 
potential to absorb Penang’s excess of semi-skilled labour. The southern part of the island 
quickly became highly industrialised thanks to the establishment of the Bayan Lepas Free 
Industrial Zone that was set up in 1972. It has over the years attracted more than 250 MNC 
high-tech companies such as Dell, Intel, AMD, Altera, Motorola, Agilent Technologies, Hitachi, 
Osram, Plexus, Robert Bosch, Fairchild Semiconductors and Seagate, most of which are 
mainly located within Bayan Lepas. Due to the nature of the MNCs Penang has concentrated 
mainly on the manufacturing sector focusing in particular  on semiconductors, computer and 
computer peripherals, data storage devices, telecommunications equipment (software) and 
consumer electronics. To service the MNCs more than 1200 local support industries have 
sprung up within and outside Bayan Lepas. They are mainly specialised within automation, 
plastics, precision engineering and metal work, chemical products and packaging of various 
kinds. 
 
A consequence of these developments has been that today Penang state has the fourth-
largest economy in Malaysia, after Perak, Selangor and Johor. Manufacturing has now 
become the most important component of the Penang economy contributing about 43% to the 
State's GDP.6
                                                 
6 Penang Sustainability Report 2008. 
 Furthermore, in January 2005 Penang was formally accorded Multimedia 
Super Corridor Cyber City status, the first outside of Cyberjaya on the Malaysian peninsula, 
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with the aim of promoting the development of high-tech industrial parks which are to conduct 
cutting-edge ICT research. The latest area of research in Penang to be taken up is the 
establishment of a biotech park thus leveraging on its industrial infrastructure that has made it 
Malaysia’s foremost electronic hub. These new initiatives are in line with the 9th Malaysia 
Plan, which has identified these sectors as some of the main areas that is to help drive the 
country forward towards a developed knowledge economy as required by the Cyber City 
status. 
 
As mentioned above, however, the state has experienced a gradual decline of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) due to factors such as cheaper factor conditions in Vietnam and Indonesia 
and in China and India, and arguably, lagging human capital in the form of a well educated 
and up-to-date labour force. Furthermore, the entrepôt trade has declined due in part to the 
loss of Penang's free-port status in 1969, but also due to the aggressive development of Port 
Klang near the federal capital Kuala Lumpur. However, the container terminal in Butterworth, 
on the mainland side of Penang State, is in for a major upgrade. This is detailed in the 
Northern Corridor Economic Region developmental plan that was initiated in June 2007. The 
main objective was to service the northern Malaysian region, but still carter for the rest of 
Malaysia in competition with Port Klang.7
 
 Other important sectors of Penang's economy that 
are to be upgraded according to this plan include, for example, health tourism, which is 
currently mainly clustered in the northern part of Penang Island as well as in Georgetown. 
Other sectors that are to be upgraded are finance, shipping and a variety of service sectors 
catering for the industrial development in the state per se. 
 
Penang State Government’s Economic Policies and the Chinese SME Community 
In order to counter the above mentioned industrial decline the previous Penang State 
Government (PSG) under chief minister Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon initiated a recovery 
oriented economic policy. Owing to limited land size and the highly industrialised nature of 
Penang's economy, agriculture was given little emphasis in its developmental plans. This 
                                                 
7 Lim Wei Seong 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penang. 
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comes as no surprise, as agriculture was only contributing about 1.3% to the state GDP in 
2000 and there is no prospect of it to increase substantially in the years to come. The PSG is 
thus concentrating on servicing and upgrading the current industrial setup. 
 
Even though Penang got the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) status in 2005 the Penang 
manufacturing industry still faces stiff competition from the original MSC on the Malaysian 
mainland thus threatening its position as Malaysia’s ‘Silicon Island’. The up until March 2008 
Chinese dominated Gerakan Party, that has led the state government since 1969, was well 
aware of this and took several steps to address this threat. According to Peggy Toe, selling 
Penang was an important element in the government’s industry competitive strategies and in 
line with the economic prescriptions promoted by both Vision 2020 and MSC for setting-up a 
new Malaysia. Accordingly, Penang stepped up its plans to become a symbol of this new 
emerging era (Toe 2003: 554). 
 
In 1992, Penang Development Corporation (PDC)8
 
 was asked to develop a road map for 
operationalising the main ideas behind Vision 2020. In drawing on this vision PDC developed 
the theme ‘Penang: Into the 21st Century’ to outline its goals. It first aimed at diversify 
Penang’s economy by nurturing a local manufacturing capability that was high-tech based 
and competitive driven, thereby responding to the demands from the various MNCs, and 
second, to develop a sophisticated service sector buttressed by the ‘state-of-the-art’ 
technology and skills, and finally, to modernise and upgrade the dormant productive 
capabilities in the agricultural sectors. 
Besides these initiatives the Penang State Government, strongly supported by the private 
sector, initiated several projects that laid the groundwork for implementing the strategies as 
defined by PDC. For example, two new Free Industrial Zones and five industrial parks 
covering 1,850 ha of land on both Penang Island and Port Wellersley on mainland Penang 
were developed. Tax incentive schemes were introduced to entice foreign capital. A highly 
                                                 
8 PDC was inaugurated in November 1969. It is still the main state development agency to help develop, plan, implement and 
promote socio-economic projects on behalf of the state government. It thus functions as the investment arm of the state 
government (http://www.pdc.gov.my/ ). 
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diversified electronics industry and supporting industries in engineering, metal, plastics and 
packaging for the electronic/electric industry were courted together with industries in the 
textiles and apparel sectors. 
 
Initially MNCs were attracted to Penang due to its highly qualified labour resource, an efficient 
transport and communication infrastructure and the existence of an efficient banking and 
insurance sector combined with well developed freight and forwarding services. Automation 
was encouraged right from the start in order to keep labour costs down. The Penang State 
Government was quite supportive of foreign ventures and proved an important facilitator of 
business. The Penang State was so successful in reinventing itself as a progressive 
developmental state that manufacturing increased from 13% of GDP in 1971 to more than 
50% of the GDP in 2000, employing more than 40% of the total labour force. In June 2000 
there were 693 factories in Penang with a paid-up capital exceeding RM 7.3 billion. Of these 
37.8% of investments came from overseas investors, the largest being Taiwan followed by 
Japan, the US and Singapore (ibid 2003: 554).9 Furthermore, besides providing both tax and 
non-tax incentive packages for both local SME industries as well as for MNCs the Penang 
State Government introduced two new economic facilitators to help further develop the 
industrial setup in Penang, namely investPenang and the Socio-Economic and Environmental 
Research Institute (SERI)10
 
. 
Now, before discussing how the economic facilitators and government initiatives have 
impacted on the Chinese SME business community that constitutes a major part of the 
industrial setup in Penang and is the main focus in this article, a definition of what is meant by 
SME is described. Generally, it can be defined into two broad categories11
 
: 
                                                 
9 Although tourism is the second pillar of growth in Penang this sector will not be discussed in this report due to the main 
topic, which focuses on Chinese SME entrepreneurs. For further readings on the tourism sector, see Peggy Teo 2003. 
10 With regard to SERI this is a research institution that is mainly used by the Penang State Government and as such is of no 
direct help to the SME community. It does, however, provide the government with input of the developments within this part 
of the industrial setup (http://www.seri.com.my/index.php ). 
11 The following is based on definitions provided by ‘Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation’ 
(http://www.smidec.gov.my/index.jsp). For further information of the SME community in Penang, please see Penang 
Economic Monthly. Vol. 9, Issue 4. April 2007. 
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1. Manufacturing, Manufacturing-Related Services and Agro-based industries: Small and 
medium enterprises in the manufacturing, manufacturing related services and agro-based 
industries are enterprises with full-time employees not exceeding 150 or with annual sales 
turnover not exceeding RM25 million. 
 
2. Services, Primary Agriculture and Information and Communication Technology (ICT): 
Small and medium enterprises in the services, primary agriculture and Information & 
Communication Technology (ICT) sectors are enterprises with full-time employees not 
exceeding 50 or with annual sales turnover not exceeding RM5 million. 
 
Based on these framework definitions a characteristic of the Chinese SME community in 
Penang can be summarised as follows: about 85% of the local industry in Penang can be 
classified as SMEs, the majority of which are owned by Chinese. During an interview with 
representatives from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Georgetown it was emphasised 
that the typical Chinese SME is currently undergoing a change. They are not only family run 
enterprises but are evolving into more complex and diversified entities, the specific 
characteristics of which depends on the size and constitution of the individual company. The 
micro or ‘Mom and Pap’ Chinese SMEs are typically very small family owned and run 
companies that produce a rather narrow range of products. This is especially the case if they 
are suppliers to major local or foreign companies. The small and medium SMEs constitute a 
more diversified lot. The most efficient of them has hired professional, not necessarily 
Chinese, managers to run the business in an ‘arm’s length’ mode, but maintain the control 
over business assets and strategies themselves. Interestingly, the development of the latter is 
based on generally acknowledged Chinese modes of networking. For example, guanxi ways 
of networking constitute an important strategy among ethnic Chinese in Penang thus 
matching the general stereotype of Chinese business practices.12
 
 
It is thus possible to divide the Penang Chinese SME community into three main categories: 
1) a ‘classical’ one consisting of 100% family owned and run SMEs (mainly micro SMEs), 2) 
                                                 
12 Cribb (2000), Jacobsen (2007), Tong and Yong (1998). 
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100% family owned SMEs that are professionally managed according to ‘arm’s length’ 
principles, but make use of ‘classical’ Chinese business strategies and network practices 
(mainly small and some medium SMEs), and 3)  those SMEs that are about 50% or less 
owned by Chinese entrepreneurs, are professionally, that is, not family managed, and 
combine ‘classical’ Chinese strategies and network practices with modern market seeking 
techniques thus pushing them towards the upper level of the SME category and perhaps into 
the category of public listed companies (PLC) thus leaving the SME category all together. 
 
There are two main reasons behind this differentiation of the Penang SME community. First 
and foremost, there is an ever entrenching global market economy that forces structural as 
well as organisational changes on the companies towards establishing a division of labour 
between ownership and management and to venture outside the immediate domestic market 
in order to expand their reach. The second reason for this differentiation is what can be 
defined as a negative tendency towards re-investment in one’s own company due to what 
other observers have define as a localised mindset that focuses more on profit optimisation 
than technological and managerial upgrading. This goes especially for the 100% family 
owned and run companies. This kind of companies is open towards new production avenues 
that turn them into becoming, for example, suppliers to MNCs, but this does not move them 
up the value chain due to the before mentioned mindset. What, however, all categories of 
Chinese SMEs share is a kind of openness towards change per se that drives them forward 
although in different directions. This is, according to representatives from the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, an inherent aspect within the nature of the Chinese business 
practice, namely an acceptance and willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. 
 
Interestingly, the differences between the three groups of Chinese SMEs are also reflected in 
their respective network practices. For example, the smaller the SME are the more ethnically 
based their network practices become. As a company moves up the value chain its network 
practices begin to cross ethnic boundaries and branch out into a non-ethnic related business 
environment. This has a direct bearing on the degree of linkages to the global business 
community. Such linkages demand cross-cultural relationships, as market forces do not 
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distinguish between race and culture, but rather on whether a company is capable of thriving 
in a competitive environment. In this particular context there is thus a real difference between 
the global and the local. The above described differences within the Chinese SME business 
community constitute what I later on will refer to as a variety of fault lines within this 
community, thus showing that the latter is not a homogeneous community but rather a 
dynamic one in which firms develops, dies or do not do anything but survive and are quite 
satisfied by doing just that! 
 
 
Dynamics within the Chinese owned SME community: From SME to PLC and (almost) 
back again: on the impact of the affirmative action policy 
As discussed above the Chinese SME community in Penang is not a homogeneous or static 
group, - a fact that will be elaborated upon later on in greater detail. Not even the top 
companies of the SME group constitute a static upper layer of the SME category. Here 
medium sized companies move beyond the upper limits of the SME category and into the 
order of public listed companies. The demarcating lines between these two main categories 
are thus not absolute! The latter type of companies constitutes a kind of role model for those 
SMEs that aspire to move up the value chain. There are some factors, however, that work 
against the full developmental potential of the PLCs, - factors that have their roots dating back 
to the New Economic Polices (NEP) and the embedded affirmative action policy, both initiated 
in 1971. 
 
In an attempt to explain the relationship between NEP’s economic policies and the underlying 
inter-ethnic dimension Khoo Boo Teik writes that without dismissing some of NEP’s 
underlying, more generalised principles about an equitable inter-ethnic distribution of wealth 
via the affirmative action programmes, he suggests that Malaysia’s NEP was never 
exclusively restricted to ethnicity and ethnic relations. NEP encompassed state policies that 
affected ethnic identities, inter-ethnic power sharing and an ethnically targeted distribution of 
developmental benefits, but was not confined to these issues alone (Khoo 2004: 4). 
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Khoo concludes that NEP could heighten as well as diminish ethnic differences to the extent 
that issues of ethnic identity and problems of cultural grievances in Malaysia had always had 
an economic aspect to them. The substantive attainment of NEP’s socioeconomic goals 
diminished the likelihood of intense ethnic economic rivalry while the Mahathir regime’s 
economic solutions to cultural problems in the 1990s encouraged a deeper sense of national 
purpose and identity (Khoo 2004: 18).  
 
However, the ethnic issue still lingers on. Zooming in on the political realm one finds several 
examples of a discourse on more or less tense inter-ethnic relations just beneath the surface. 
For example, during 2006 several complains from the Malaysian community in Penang have 
been voiced of being marginalised in terms of political influence due to the fact that the 
Chinese dominated political party Gerakan from the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional has held 
the position of Chief Minister since 1969 and up until March 2008. This critique of not being a 
multi-cultural party and thus not contributing towards forwarding Penang’s and ultimately 
Malaysia’s, racial harmony has been denied by the party’s vice-president, Datuk’ Teng Hock 
Nam. He said that such statements are not fair just by looking at the racial makeup of its 
members. Even though about 80 % of Gerakan members are Chinese, the party has always 
adopted a non-racial approach to Malaysian politics.13
 
 
Despite indicated otherwise by various observers, racial tensions do exist and contemporary 
Malaysia has still not moved beyond the confines of the affirmative action policy. As a 
consequence conflicting inter-ethnic relations are occasionally surfacing, if not constantly 
simmering just beneath an otherwise tranquil multiracial surface. One only needs to read the 
articles in the Straits Times in late November 2007 on Malay Chinese, who immigrated to 
other countries due to better life conditions there than in Malaysia, as well as the articles on 
Malay Indian demonstrations in November and early December 2007. That the inter-ethnic 
question was still not solved in July 2009 could be seen in an article in The Straits Times, 
where the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad maintained that non-Malays are the real 
masters in Malaysia. Mahathir were cited for saying that the affirmative action share of the 
                                                 
13 The Star. Nov. 13, 2007. 
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corporate pie is only 20%, while Chinese Malaysians hold 50% despite them making up a 
mere 26% of the population.14
 
 On the basis of these simmering sub-societal tensions I will in 
the following maintain that the affirmative action policy, besides demonstrating that it is still in 
existence, also hampers the Chinese SMEs efforts to move up the value chain, thus 
damaging the development of the Malaysian economy per se. 
As stated by representatives from several PLCs during fieldwork in Penang in 2007 and 2008, 
due to a federal governmental requirement of 30% Malay equity ownership of non-affirmative 
action owned PLCs, most Chinese company owners have chosen to transform their 
companies into holding companies instead of creating one major local company. The logic 
behind this dates back to a 1975 federal governmental legislation on investment practices, 
which states that Chinese entrepreneurs had to apply for permission to invest more than 2,5 
million Ringgit (RM) in any type of business. This benchmark is currently (2008-2009) being 
debated and a new benchmark of about 10 million RM is proposed. If a Chinese entrepreneur 
got the permission to invest from the authorities, then 30% of this new enterprise is to be 
handled over to Malays as either shares or 30% Malay equity ownership of the business in 
question in case the company wants to get listed on the stock exchange in Kuala Lumpur. If a 
company intended to invest more that 2.5 million RM and the 30% affirmative action equity is 
not met, then it will be scrutinised by the authorities.15
 
 
The political rationale behind this business ownership policy was and still is to enforce Malay 
participation in non-Malay owned companies so as to raise the percentage of Malay 
entrepreneurship in the Malaysian corporate world to at least 30%. The downside of this 
policy has so far been twofold. First, it has created tensions between Chinese and Malay 
entrepreneurs in terms of business ownership due to a general notion of that the Malay 
private investment rate is relatively low and that suitable Malay partners are difficult to come 
by. Second, Chinese entrepreneurs have, when contemplating listing their companies on the 
stock exchange, formed holding companies instead, which consist of numerous specialised 
                                                 
14 The Straits Times Wednesday, July 22, 2009. See also The Straits Times 21 April 2008. 
15 For a critical discussion of this remnant from the NEP, see www.atimes.com 11 April 2008 and again on 23 January 2009. 
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subsidiaries that functions as each other’s supplier. In this way their companies are bypassing 
federal requirements on investment practices and thereby maintain full control over their 
companies. Third, those Malay entrepreneurs who managed to become part-owners of those 
non-Malay owned companies have become a minority among the ethnic Malays. The latter 
ethnie has thus been divided into a small corporate linked wealthy group, and into a majority 
group that continue to constitute a low income, mainly agricultural based, group thereby 
further aggravating the societal positioning of the Malays in relation to especially the ethnic 
Chinese. An intra-ethnic issue has thus turned into a class issue! 
 
Several major Chinese owned SMEs and PLCs do, however, have Malays on their board of 
directors. This they have due to investment plans thus tapping into the political advantages 
that such a partnership might entail. To have or not have Malays on the board of directors 
thus depends on a given business strategy! The main rationale behind such strategies is thus 
based on how to control company assets and how to get more capital and government 
contracts (especially within the construction sector) so as to be able to implement new and 
capital intensive investment plans. 
 
 
SMEs/PLCs and the Impact of Governmental Initiated Economic Facilitators 
The Chinese SME community does not exist in a vacuum but relates to and depends on a 
variety of external institutions for their technological and managerial upgrading and thus 
ultimately their very existence. Here I will focus on investPenang as a representative of a 
governmental initiated economic facilitator. When discussing these facilitators with the 
Chinese SME community in general one has to divide it into two major halves: one that caters 
for the service sector and one that concentrates on the electronic and electrical manufacturing 
sector. The former has the impression of being left out of the Penang State Government’s 
economic polices, as it is putting more emphasis on the high-tech sectors, which they are not 
engaged in or do not have the capacity to do so. They are of the opinion that the government 
is especially catering for the other kinds of SMEs, as they are in a better position to attract 
FDI so that the government can fund and thus further its own economic development 
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scheme(s). This division of the SME community has over time the potential of creating 
negative economic fault-lines within this community, as it is quite expensive in terms of 
knowledge, man power and technology for the non-high tech SMEs to expand into the more 
specialised field of manufacturing within the electronic and electrical sector. 
 
From the perspective of the Penang State Government this scenario is not the case. The 
state has initiated a SME bank so as to support and further the economic development of all 
sections of the SME community. It has furthermore introduced various governmental 
institutions such as PDC, investPenang and SERI so as to help the SMEs to grow and 
prosper. Focusing on investPenang, its main centre of attention is to sustain, rejuvenate and 
promote the business environment in Penang through encouraging to continued investments 
in especially the electronic and electrical manufacturing sector. investPenang envisions itself 
as the main driver of a three-pronged strategy that is based on combining technological 
development, industrial infrastructure and private business so as to attain a sustainable 
economic growth and development for Penang and Malaysia in general. 
In relation to the SME community in general, investPenang recognises that SMEs are very 
important for the economic development of Penang, as they constitute about 90% of the 
industrial setup. The SMEs, however, are not, according to investPenang, that easy to work 
with due a particular mindset that dominates many of them. First of all, quite a few are content 
by maintaining the size they have achieved by now. They generally have a negative attitude 
towards reinvesting their surplus capital in their businesses in order to push them up the value 
chain. Instead, they concentrate on profit maximisation that results in a seemingly 
contradictory planning, namely exhibiting rather high saving rates of about 30% to 40%, and 
at the same time wanting to show off their wealth and therefore not necessarily reinvest the 
profit they have generated in new technology and/or management practices.16
                                                 
16 Personal communication March 2008. 
 This has 
resulted in what has been defined as having a localised mindset that works against those 
developmental initiatives that investPenang are suggesting for this particular section of the 
industrial setup. As a consequence a rather negative attitude towards the SME community 
has developed within investPenang, as it does not see it as its responsibility to nurture the 
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SMEs toward higher growth and greater market integration. According to investPenang their 
mission in this connection is to prepare the ground for the development of for them the most 
pertinent SMEs. Basically, the rest must help themselves to develop further!17
 
 
Interestingly, there is a contradiction in what investPenang is saying it is doing and what they 
are supposed to be doing. According to investPenang’s statutes, it is to groom the SME and 
PLC environment to prepare them for pushing themselves and Penang up the value chain, 
especially in the electronic and electrical manufacturing sector. This means that these 
companies will face increasing global competition, as the market opens up the higher up one 
move along the value chain. On the basis of this, investPenang seems to be reluctant in 
helping SMEs in the service sector to prepare for this increasing competition. Instead, the 
strategy seems to be on upgrading only those SEMs within the manufactory sector so that 
they can support pertinent PLCs in their respective internationalisation strategies as well as 
already established MNCs. In this sense investPenang relates to the theories of Michael 
Porter, especially that section in his ‘Determinants of National Advantages’ that caters for 
related and supporting national industries in order to prepare for global competition.18
 
 
The present author is sceptical towards such an approach, as making a distinction between 
local and global markets is rather problematic. Arguably, being competitive globally and 
having a solid position in ones domestic market is not a contradiction but a complementary 
state of being thus reinforcing a company’s capabilities to compete in both areas. As it is now 
it seems as if investPenang is tying the SMEs in the service sector to a specific section of the 
market thus leaving it to the mercy of global competition. If this is the case, then it is a 
counterproductive approach, as it reduces the individual company’s competitive edge thus 
jeopardizing its long term survival. Instead, investPenang must help or at least prepare all 
local SMEs in the domestic market to go global, as otherwise they will not be able to 
withstand global competition within their respective sectors. It is a well-known fact that the 
global market is currently penetrating even the most remote sections of a given domestic 
                                                 
17 Personal communication March 2008. 
18 Porter 1990: 33-129. 
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market. It seems that this is a weak spot in investPenang’s business strategy with regards to 
the SME community and the latter’s position in an increasing globalising domestic industrial 
development. 
 
 
The SME/PLC community and Vision 2020, MSC and NCER 
According to a top state executive councillor Vision 2020 and the MSC was and still is a kind 
of wishful thinking. As such the Penang State Government accepts it. However, the vision is 
gradually loosing it attractiveness, as a split between ideology and reality begins to emerge. 
As previously mentioned there are many tensions in Malaysia in terms of ethnic and religious 
cleavages that hinder a realisation of the vision and its latest successor ‘1Malaysia’. When 
relating Vision 2020 and MSC to the industrial sector, and in particular to the SME 
community, the latter is becoming more sceptical towards it, and is beginning to term it 
(political) ‘hot air’, meaning that both the vision and the MSC is more rhetoric than action, 
implementation and development. The main problem for the industrial sector, and especially 
for the biggest SMEs, PLCs and MNCs, is human resources. This is a problem that, 
according to the state executive councillor, is not taken probably care of by the political 
establishment in terms of fund, education and training programmes. The quality of the current 
level of labour power is not high enough compared to international standards. This has a 
negative impact on industrial performance, as the different industries, representing both local 
as well as transnational companies in the Penang industrial setup, are losing their competitive 
edge in the global competition. 
 
When asked whether Vision 2020 or the MSC fits into the state economic planning scheme 
the state executive councillor said that there were no deliberate attempts of incorporating the 
two. Penang is dominated by low end manufacturing industries and cannot as such move up 
the value chain just by incorporating the two. There are simply not enough skilled labours to 
do that. In order to move up the value chain in a more concrete and coherent manner, 
pertinent and realistic R&D initiatives are needed, not visions! As already mentioned there is a 
major lack within the area of human resources. This is currently being sought solved by 
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simultaneously importing technicians from abroad and by upgrading PSDC, which plays a key 
role in this connection. Unfortunately, Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang is currently not 
capable of contributing effectively towards solving this problem due to a lack of qualified staff 
and funding. Finally, further but perhaps more indirectly aggravating this situation is the 
increasing competition from China and India as well as competition from other ASEAN 
countries such as Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia and not the least Vietnam, as they 
attract both low level manufacturing and high-tech MNCs. This is why more R&D and a 
continuing upgrading of human resources are urgently needed in Penang if it is to maintain 
and further develop its position as a high-tech hub19
 
. 
Some of the things that the Penang State Government can do to leverage this situation is to 
re-orientate the current dominant position of the low end manufacturing sector towards more 
focus on R&D, upgrading both PDC and investPenang’s role as industrial facilitators as well 
as adding further financial resources to the tertiary institutions in order to make them capable 
of working more closely together with the industrial sectors. Furthermore, the Penang State 
Government should through SERI take a more serious approach towards the SME community 
by upgrading and integrating it into an overall industrial master plan so as to create a more 
holistic industrial policy for Penang per se. Finally, the state government should, as an 
economic facilitator par excellence, focus even more on upgrading the physical infrastructure 
and stage more aggressive international investment promotion tours so as to make more 
foreign companies and investors aware of the possibilities in Penang thus encouraging them 
to establish themselves in the pertinent industrial sectors. All these initiatives, however, will be 
of no avail if the current affirmative action policy is not dismantled or abolished all together. 
Equal opportunities for all the three main ethnic groups in Penang and in Malaysia in general 
are a sine qua non if the industrial setup is to move up the value chain as mentioned earlier 
on. Interestingly, there problems seem to be recognised by the federal government according 
to newspaper articles in the New Straits Times on 3 August 2009. Here the current Prime 
Minister Najib Razak is quoted as saying that the affirmative action equity shareholding since 
the inception of the NEP in 1971 appears to be stuck at 18% or 19% in 2009. He continues: ‘It 
                                                 
19 Personal communication February 2008. 
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is madness if we continue with these policies (affirmative action policies (MJ)) even after they 
had failed for up to 19 years!’ (NST Aug. 3, 2009). The important question is, however, 
whether it is possible to implement such a major policy change due to the fact that the federal 
government, based as it is on UMNO and its coalition partners in the BA, is in need of 
especially the Malay votes if it wants to regain an absolute majority in parliament, as it had 
before the March 2008 national election, or just to stay in power! 
 
Now, how does, for example, the SME community in general relate to Vision 2020, the MSC 
and NCER? The Chinese Chamber of Commerce that is catering for a majority of the Chinese 
owned SMEs in Penang does not see major benefits coming out of the Northern Corridor 
Economic Region (NCER) initiatives launched on 30 July 2007, as it mostly focuses on 
agricultural developments, logistics and so-called medically related recreational tourism. In 
relation to the question of sub-contracting in this connection the Chamber is of the opinion 
that most of it would probably go to Malay companies, as they have better access to 
government contacts especially within the construction sector. What, according to the 
Chamber, their members could expect from the NCER would mostly be small contracts that 
probably will not have a great impact on the SME community as a whole. In relation to Vision 
2020 and SMC this was also of little interests for the Chinese Chamber, as its members 
would not be able to draw much benefit from it due to different industrial specialisation. 
Furthermore, the localised and thus parochial focus that permeates many SMEs within the 
service sector does not fit into these two dynamic developmental schemes thereby reinforcing 
the before mentioned budding fault-lines between them and SMEs in the high-tech sector. 
 
In relation to Vision 2020 and the MSC a representative from Pentamaster said that it was an 
interesting vision but poorly implemented. This has something to do with the ability of the 
public administration that is to implement these schemes. As for now it do not have the right 
educational background for executing the vision and the more concrete initiatives in a 
professional and correct way. The level of professionalism has to be raised considerably if 
Vision 2020 and MSC should become a reality and not only a national political ideological 
construction. Like several other informants, the representative from Pentamaster did not have 
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high thoughts about the general abilities of the public administration when discussing actual 
implementation and functionality of various government policies. 
 
I think it is important to point towards a lack of sensitivity on behalf of the federal 
developmental state, when introducing new directions for how Malaysia as a whole should 
develop. Vision 2020 and especially MSC is a case in point. Vision 2020 is in a sense 
harmless as it does not have direct impact on the industrial setup in Penang nor does it have 
a major impact on the political realm, as the latter is far more pragmatic oriented in Penang. 
MSC, on the other hand, has a direct impact on state economic policies, as it highlights 
certain sectors within the industrial set up thus neglecting other. This means that the latter 
ones, and here we are talking about SMEs and PLCs that are not engaged in the high-tech 
sector, find it more difficult to attract support from the various governmental initiated economic 
facilitators, as they are, so to speak, out of focus. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has identified sets of emerging political and economic fault-lines within the SME 
community as well as between this community, the PLCs and the MNCs based on especially 
governmental political economic initiatives. In order to create more synergy between the three 
of them it is essential for initiating a more holistic industrial development policy in Penang. 
Second, the question of developing an increasing pool of qualified labour was identified as a 
crucial one, as this is a sine qua non for Penang’s industrial establishment’s ability to change 
its current state from a low level manufacturing site towards a more R&D dominated industrial 
setup. Finally, it is not enough to focus on the PLCs and the MNCs and their respective 
needs. The SME sector is of crucial importance here, as it first of all constitutes about 90% of 
the industrial setup, and second, it constitutes an important service sector and a pool of more 
or less specialised suppliers and sub-contractors for the PLCs and MNCs. Upgrading the 
SMEs in terms of technological know-how as well as management skills is very important if 
the overall industrial setup is to be lifted further up the value chain. 
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Furthermore, this article has also shown that the Chinese owned SMEs in the electronic and 
electrical manufacturing sector do not constitute a homogeneous entity thus indicating that it 
is not notions of Chineseness that binds this group together. On the contrary, a diversification 
among these firms points towards other forces that introduce different economic fault-lines 
between the various sections within the SME community. The major fault-lines were identified 
as consisting of, first, those which divided the SME community into those that catered for the 
global market and those that were mainly directed towards the domestic market, and second, 
those SMEs that were working within the electronic and electrical manufacturing sector and 
those working in the trade and service sectors. A more subtle emerging fault-line that is 
indirectly conditioned by the two other sections was a change in which the Chinese owned 
SMEs were managed in terms of technological and managerial practices. This depended on 
where on a developmental continuum a SME could be positioned. The smaller the more 
traditionally oriented the SMEs were managed, and the higher up the value chain a SME 
could be identified a more arms-length structure of management practices began to emerge. 
Arguably, identifying the forces that lay behind these emerging fault-lines shows that intra-
ethnic relation are not the driving forces behind the diversification of the Chinese SME 
business community, but rather an encroaching global market economy that pushes though 
structural changes within the individual firm thus producing the above mentioned fault-lines in 
the process. 
 
These developments thus highlight a situation in which external forces in relation to a given 
market reinforces inter- and intra-ethnic diversification thus confirming the explanatory power 
of the triangular approach taken in this study. For example, how the Chinese in Penang do 
business do not depend on the stereotypical definitions that some academics have promoted 
as being the ultimate truth behind the driving forces of Chinese entrepreneurship in Malaysia, 
or for that matter in Southeast Asia in general, namely culturally determined and intra-ethnic 
based modes of doing business.20
                                                 
20 Gesteland (2005), Nisbett et al. (2001), Bolt (2000), Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996), Redding (1993). 
 Instead we are talking about nationally political engineered 
notions of ethnicity that is to maintain Malays as the indigenous and thus legitimate 
dominating ethnic group thereby indirectly defining the Chinese and Indians as immigrant 
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groups. We thus have a situation in which, on the one hand, engagement in the global market 
economy produces inter-ethnic co-opetition thus opening up the domestic market to global 
competition, and on the other hand a nationally political engineered notion of inter-ethnic 
relations that might indirectly have a negative impact on domestic economic development due 
to the latter’s global reach. Inter- and intra-ethnic relations are thus pushed from a back-stage 
to a front-stage position and vice versa depending on where one wants to put ones 
perspective as an observer. These insights would be rather difficult to detect if an observer 
had taken a decoupling instead of a triangulation approach. For a decoupler the policy 
initiatives in relation to inter-ethnic relation and its ramification on the industrial setup would 
be perceived as mainly domestic processes detached from a global context. The more subtle 
global inroads into the national economic in the form of structural changes would most likely 
have gone unnoticed due to the focus on domestic politicking. 
 
Arguably, the affirmative action policy has never posed a constraint to Chinese 
entrepreneurs. It has, however, a significant impact on the growth potentials of the Chinese 
owned enterprises. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese and other ethnic groups in 
Penang and Malaysia per se will continue to thrive despite such political initiatives. This is 
evident from the increasing number of, in this particular case, Chinese owned petty traders 
and hawkers, small over medium to big business units currently operating in Penang. Indeed, 
the pro-affirmative action policies have deprived Chinese and Indian youths of job 
opportunities in the government sector as well as entry into the public tertiary institutions even 
though they are qualified. However, these "drop-outs" have an enterprising drive that is 
motivated exactly because of the affirmative action policy thus making them fend for 
themselves by either studying or seeking jobs overseas or by venturing into private 
business.21
                                                 
21 Personal communication February 2008. 
 Talking specifically about the Chinese these kinds of challenges were interpreted 
by representatives from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce as an inherent aspect of 
Chinese entrepreneurship, namely openness towards change. As has been discussed in this 
article it is not possible to make a distinction between the past and the future of Chinese 
entrepreneurship. In Penang the two will always be conflated in the present. 
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